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Several papers study the effect of trust by using the answer to the World Values Survey (WVS) question
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful
in dealing with people?" to measure the level of trust. Glaeser et al. (2000) question the validity of
this measure by showing that it is not correlated with senders' behavior in the standard trust game,
but only with his trustworthiness. By using a large sample of German households, Fehr et al. (2003)
find the opposite result: WVS-like measures of trust are correlated with the sender's behavior, but
not with its trustworthiness.  In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two
components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both,
we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on
past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.
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luigi.zingales@gsb.uchicago.eduSince Arrow (1972) remarked that “It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence,” economists 
have started paying attention to the effect of trust on economic activity and development. In 
an influential paper, Knack and Kneefer (1996) find that a country's level of trust is indeed 
correlated with its rate of growth and this correlation persists even after controlling for 
quality of law enforcement (Knack and Zak (1999). Since these early contributions, there 
have been around 7,000 papers analyzing the economic effects of trust. To measure trust, 
around 500 of these papers use the answers to the World Values Survey (WVS) /General 
Social Survey (GSS) question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” to measure the level of trust. 
Glaeser et al. (2000) question the validity of this measure of trust. In an experimental setting, 
they show that the answers to the WVS question are not correlated with the sender behavior 
in the standard trust game first introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). To the 
contrary, these answers are correlated to the receiver’s behavior in the same game. Hence, 
they conclude that the WVS question is a measure of trustworthiness and not of trust. Fehr et 
al. (2003), however, challenge this result. By using a large sample of German households, 
they show that the sender behavior in a trust game is correlated with other survey-based 
measures of trust, which in turn are not correlated with trustworthiness.      
These results raise several questions. Are survey-based measures good measures of trust, like 
Fehr et al. (2003) suggest, or not, as indicated by Glaeser et al. (2000)? More specifically, 
given its preeminence in the literature, what is the WVS question measuring? Is it trust, 
trustworthiness, or neither of the two? Why do Fehr et al.’s (2003) and Glaeser et al.’s (2000) 
results differ so much? How can we explain the correlation between the answer to the WVS 
trust question and individual (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2007) or aggregate (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales 2004 and 2006) economic choices?  
  Glaeser et al.’s (2000) dismissal of the WVS question hinges on the assumption that 
the Berg et al. (1995) trust game is indeed an accurate measure of trust. But, should we trust 
the trust game to measure trust correctly? More importantly how do we define trust? Since 
Glaeser et al. (2000), several experimental papers have shown that the sender’s behavior in 
the trust game is affected by other motivations besides confidence in the receiver’s 
  2trustworthiness, such as individual risk aversion (Karlan, 2005), reciprocity, and altruism 
(Cox, 2004, and Ashraf et al., 2006).  
In light of these results, the act of trusting is now understood as the combination of 
the belief in other people’s trustworthiness and the specific preferences of the sender (risk 
aversion, reciprocity, altruism). It is useful to keep these two components separate because 
beliefs are more subject to updating and changing than preferences. It is important, thus, to 
find out what component of trust so defined (if any) is measured by the trust game and what 
component by the WVS question.   
To answer this question in this paper we run a modified trust game where we ask the 
sender to report his/her beliefs about the receiver’s behavior. By doing so, we can separate 
the sender’s expectations about the receiver’s behavior (the beliefs’ component) from his 
actions, which are affected also by his utility function.    
We find that the sender’s expectation of receiver’s trustworthiness is a good predictor 
of the quantity sent in the trust game and it is highly correlated with the trust question in the 
WVS, as well as other attitudinal questions on trust. Most interestingly, the expected 
trustworthiness is correlated with the WVS question when the sender is calculating the 
expected amount returned if he sends a larger amount of money. For smaller amounts at 
stake, the sender’s expectation reflects more the anticipated level of retaliation rather than the 
general level of trust. This suggests the WVS question is a good measure of the expectation-
component of trust in economically-relevant situations.    
When we analyze the correlation between the sender’s expectations of the receiver’s 
trustworthiness with the sender’s actual trustworthiness when he plays as a receiver, we find 
that players extrapolate their opponent’s behavior from their own. This can explain why 
Glaeser et al. (2000) find that the WVS question is correlated with trustworthiness. In highly 
homogenous populations (Chicago MBAs, Harvard undergraduates) players tend to form 
their expectations by introspecting their own behavior. This inference is not true in very 
heterogeneous populations, like the German household sample used by Fehr et al. (2003).  
This can explain why they find no correlation between the answer to the survey-based 
measures of trust that capture the trust component of the beliefs of the subject and the 
trustworthiness of the subject. 
  3 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the experimental 
design and presents some summary statistics. Section II analyzes the implications of the 
recent work on the trust game for the interpretation of the sender’s behavior in the trust game 
and his expectations. Section III presents our results. Section IV concludes.    
 
I. Experimental Design and Survey 
The data for this experiment have been collected as part of the Templeton Chicago 
Longitudinal MBA Sample (TCLMS). All the Campus MBA students of the 2008 class at the 
Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago were asked to complete a survey 
and play some games as part of a mandatory class. While participation was mandatory, the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago required that the subjects be offered 
the opportunity to opt out from the study, not consenting to the use of their data for research 
purposes. Out of 552 MBA students, 548 filled out the survey and 552 played the games.  
502 (92.28%) consented to the use of both their survey and game data. For the purpose of 
this paper, we use the data from three basic sources: the trust game, a lottery game, and the 
survey, which are explained below.  
A detailed description of the games played and of the full set of the questions asked is 
at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/sapienza/htm/templeton/TCLP.htm. 
 
A. The trust game  
The trust game we used is a slightly modified version of the trust game initially 
designed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). In this game a first mover is endowed with 
an amount of money y. The first mover decides how much to send, s ∈ [0, y], to a second 
mover. Any amount sent is multiplied by three. The second mover then decides how much to 
return, r ∈ [0, 3s], to the first mover. Consequently, the payoff of the first mover equals y – s 
+ r, and that of the second mover equals 3s – r. The amount sent is frequently referred to as a 
measure of trust, and the amount returned as a measure of trustworthiness.
1 In our 
experiment, first movers were endowed with $50 and could send any multiple of $5.  
Subjects were then asked to make three decisions. In the first decision all players had 
to decide how much of their initial endowment of $50 they wanted to send to the receiver. In 
                                                 
1 For a discussion on whether this game really captures trust see Glaeser et al. (2000) and Cox (2004). 
  4the second decision all players were asked to indicate how much they expected the second 
mover would return using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). In other words, subjects were 
offered an array like the one in Figure 1 and had to indicate how much they thought the 
second mover would return for each possible amount sent (multiples of five between $0 and 
$50). In order to motivate subjects to answer accurately, they earned $10 for each question 
where their expectation fell within ten percent of the actual response (i.e. if r – 0.1 × 3s ≤ 
E[r] ≤ r + 0.1 × 3s).  
In the third decision all players acted as receivers and were asked to submit their 
decision also using the strategy method. That is, they indicated how much they were willing 
to return for each possible amount sent without knowing how much the first mover actually 
sent.
2 Hence, each subject played the trust game twice, one time in the role of the sender and 
the other in the role of the receiver. Subjects were randomly re-matched so when they played 
as senders and receivers they played with a different person. Anonymity was insured due to 
the large size of the sample.  
The three decisions were made sequentially by subjects: first they all played the trust 
game in the role of the sender, then they elicited their beliefs about the behavior of the 
receiver, and third they played the trust game in the role of the receiver. The three were 
independent decisions. In between decisions, there was no feedback given with respect to the 
behavior of other subjects. Furthermore, when making a decision they did not know what the 
future decisions would be. However, subjects did know that they would make three decisions 
and that their actions in one would not affect their payoff in the future. This design 
guarantees that all subjects make their decisions in the same order and with the same 
information. The subjects’ earnings were determined by randomly selecting one of the three 
decisions.  
Finally, to facilitate any calculations subjects might have wanted to make during the 
second choice, the computer screen provided two buttons that when enabled instantly 
calculated the subject’s payoff and the payoff of the opponent. 





  5A fundamental difference between the standard trust game by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995) is that all subjects in our experiment played both the roles of sender and 
receiver. Moreover, our subjects were asked to make decisions behind the veil of ignorance, 
namely, before the role of either sender or receiver was assigned to them. Beliefs elicitation 
in the second decision is also a rather new feature of our game with respect to the standard 
trust game. We also implemented an incentive compatible mechanism to reward subjects’ 
accuracy of beliefs.  
 
B. Behavior in the trust game 
Table 1 – Panel A reports the main features of the behavior of the subjects in our sample. The 
average amount sent is $18.82, which is 37.64% of the senders’ initial endowment. On 
average, the amount returned is $18.02, which is 26.7% of the amount received. The 
expected amount returned is on average equal to $20.91 (31.6% in percentage terms), i.e. 
above the actual amount returned. 
The relationship between the expected amount returned and the actual amount returned 
can be clearly seen from Table 1 – Panel B. Both the quantity and the proportion returned are 
strictly increasing in the amount sent, denoting a certain degree of reciprocity and so are the 
expected amount returned, suggesting that subjects expected the degree of reciprocity. That 
the expected proportion returned is always 5% higher than the actual proportion returned 
suggests that the subjects were overly optimistic about the receiver’s trustworthiness, but 
they guessed the slope of reciprocity exactly right.  
 
C. The risk aversion game  
To measure subjects’ levels of risk aversion toward small gambles we follow Holt and Laury 
(2002). Subjects were asked to choose 15 times between a lottery where they could win an 
amount with certainty, in Option A, ranging from $50 in the first setting up to $120 in the 
fifteenth setting, with increments in multiples of five; or either $200 or zero with equal 
probability in Option B. At the end of the game one of the fifteen settings was randomly 
chosen and subjects were paid according to their decision (and the lottery drawn) in that 
setting. 
  6  According to the payoffs in this lottery, an extremely risk averse individual should 
always choose Option A, whereas an extreme risk seeking individual should always choose 
Option B. In between, as the certain amount increases, a subject should cross over from 
Option B to Option A. The less risk averse the subject is, the later the switch will occur. 
Notice that a risk neutral individual should choose Option A ten times, and switch in the 
eleventh choice to Option B. We can use the number of times the safe amount was chosen as 
an individual’s measure of risk aversion. Alternatively, if we hypothesize a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function we can infer the subject’s coefficient of relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) following Holt and Laury (2002). We hypothesize a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function of the form:   where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Then, given the payoffs of the different lotteries and the hypothesized utility function, we 
find each subject’s constant relative risk aversion r according to his/her crossover point from 
the safe option to the risky one




Table 1 – Panel C displays the number and percentage of students for each possible 
number of risky choices. The students who made 0 risky choices in the lottery are 42 (8.37% 
of the sample), and they are therefore considered to be the most risk averse students. The 
mode is at 10 risky choices, with 107 students (21.31% of the sample). As explained above, 
10 risky choices is equivalent to risk neutrality. Overall, only 58 students (11.55%) exhibit 
risk loving behavior, whereas 337 students (67.13%) are risk averse. 
 
D.  Survey questions   
In the survey, subjects were asked several questions regarding trust. First, we asked subjects 
the standard World Values Survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” We provided 
three answers for subjects to choose among them: i) Most people can be trusted, ii) Can’t be 
too careful, iii) Don’t know. As it is shown in Table 1 – Panel D, a bit more than half of the 
subjects in the sample (58.86%) answered that most people can be trusted.  
Subjects were also asked the following question: “Suppose that a new and very 
desirable dorm/apartment has become available. The University of Chicago organizes a 
                                                 
3 23 subjects were removed because they switched options more than one time. 
  7lottery to assign it among the many applicants. How confident are you that the allocation will 
be fair?” The choice of answers was: i) Not at all, ii) Not much, iii) Quite a lot, iv) A great 
deal, v) I don’t know. We asked this question to elicit (in an indirect way) their trust towards 
us, the experimenters. 90% of the students answered that they trust the University of Chicago 
quite a lot (42.74%) or a great deal (47.24%). Only 1% does not trust it at all.   
Another question was: “Suppose that while walking on Michigan Avenue in Chicago 
you lose your wallet with $1,000 dollars inside. A random person that you do not know finds 
it. He or she does not know you, but he or she is aware that the money belongs to you and 
knows your name and address. He or she can keep the money without incurring any 
punishment. According to you, what do you think is the probability he or she will return the 
money to you? (Report a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means that the money won’t be 
returned for sure and 100 means that it will be returned for sure.)”  On average students 
thought that they had a 34.87% chance of getting their wallet back. The mode is at 50%. 
Only 36% thought that the probability was less than 25%.  
Finally, we asked our students “How good are you at detecting people who are 
trustworthy?” And the possible answers were: i) Not good at all, ii) Not very good, iii) Good, 
iv) Very good, v) I don’t know. 90% of the students answered that they were good (60%) or 
very good (30%) at detecting people who are trustworthy. Table 1 – Panel E provides the 
correlation among these key variables. 
 
II. What Does the Trust Game Measure? 
The World Values Survey question on trust aims at measuring generalized trust, namely the 
expectation of the respondent regarding the trustworthiness of other individuals. Implicit in 
Glaeser et al. (2000) is the assumption that the sender’s behavior in the Berg et al.’s (1995) 
trust game is measuring only the expectation about the receiver’s trustworthiness. As Karlan 
(2005) shows, however, the sender’s behavior is affected by risk aversion. Even if 
individuals should be risk neutral for small gambles, they are not. Hence, if we want to 
extract the trust component in the amount sent in a trust game, we should at the very 
minimum control for risk aversion.  
In addition, the senders’ behavior in the trust game is indicative of the senders’ 
expectations only if people have selfish expectations. However, if people had selfish 
  8expectations they would always return zero, but this is neither the case in any of the trust 
game’s results reported in the literature, nor our case. In fact, it is remarkable that 90% of the 
MBA students (a group not normally recognized for their altruism) in one of the most 
economically-minded MBA program in the world actually sent back a positive amount.  
Starting with Rabin (1993), but also in Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997), Levine 
(1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002) 
and Andreoni and Miller (2002), researchers have interpreted the behavior of the receiver in 
the trust game as an indication of other regarding preferences (altruism, reciprocity, inequity 
aversion or guilt). Cox (2004), for instance, finds evidence of reciprocity and altruism. If 
subjects have other regarding preferences when they play as receivers, however, it is likely 
that they have other regarding preferences when they play as senders too. Indeed, when we 
tried to rationalize each sender’s behavior as an optimal choice given his/her expectation and 
his/her level of risk aversion, we could not make sense of it unless we hypothesized that the 
sender had some form of “other regarding preferences”.  Individual choices can be explained 
as rational ones only if we assume – following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) – that the sender’s 
expected utility depends not only on his/her payoff, but also on the comparison between 
his/her payoff and his/her opponent’s payoff
4. If the sender has other regarding preferences, 
however, his/her choices of the quantity sent do not only reflect his/her level of trust toward 
the receiver, but also the fact that he/she compares his/her payoff with that of his/her 
opponent.  
  For our purpose, it is useful to divide the concept of trust into two components: 
belief-based trust and preference-based trust. In theory the two are clearly distinct. Per given 
type of preferences, an individual who has higher expectations about other people’s 
trustworthiness will send more. Similarly, per given level of expectations a more altruistic 
individual will send more. To isolate these two components we use the amount a sender 
expects to receive for a given amount sent. This expectation should be unaffected by the 
sender’s utility function and should be a true measure of the receiver’s expected level of 
trustworthiness of the receiver.  
  This expectation does not need to be a constant proportion across the amount sent (in 
fact it is not). For low amounts of money sent, one would expect that the receiver would 
                                                 
4 Calculation available from the authors. 
  9retaliate out of rage for the stinginess of the sender. Hence, not only is it important to 
determine whether the WVS question is related to the expectation of trust at all, but it is also 
important to establish to what expectation it is connected to. Is it connected to the expectation 
expressed for low amounts or large amounts?   
 
III. Results 
  Table 3 tries to replicate Glaeser et al.’s (2000) results on the sender’s behavior with 
the variables at our disposition, which are defined in Table 2.  Instead of the financial 
generosity to the poor, or hours spent volunteering used by Glaeser et al., as a proxy for 
altruism we use  a measure of unconditional cooperation derived from an n-version of a 
prisoner’s dilemma game.
5 
On average, women send 10% less than men and this effect is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Older people send less, white people more, and so do American citizens, but 
all these effects are economically small and not statistically significant. Subjects who exhibit 
unconditional cooperation send on average 13% more than subjects who defect, this effect is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
                                                 
5 In order to observe the subjects’ willingness to cooperate, we had them play a social dilemma based on the 
commonly‐used linear public good game (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Isaac, Walker, and Thomas, 1984). Subjects 
were  randomly  assigned  into  groups  of  eight  and  given  an  endowment  of  $50.  Each  subject  then  decided 
whether to contribute c to the public good. Contributions to the public good are costly to the subject but increase 
the earnings of others. Specifically, subject i’s earnings equal $50 – ci + 0.3 × ∑ jcj. Unlike in most public good 

















  10In the four columns of Table 3, we insert four different measures of trust. Only one is 
statistically significant. This result is not very different from Glaeser et al. (2000): in their 
case, only two of the four measures of trust they include in their regressions are statistically 
significant. The only difference from Glaeser et al.’s results and ours is that the significant 
measures in Glaeser et al.’s are two attitudinal survey questions that ask specifically about 
trust in strangers
6, whereas in our case the significant trust measure is the WVS question.      
Since Glaeser et al. (2000), several experimental papers have shown that the sender’s 
behavior in the trust game is affected by other motivations besides trust, such as individual 
risk aversion (Karlan, 2005) and reciprocity and altruism (Cox, 2004, and Ashraf et al., 
2006). If we define trust as the expectation that the receiver will behave nicely vis-à-vis the 
sender, the sender’s behavior is not just a measure of trust. It is a combination of trust, risk 
aversion, and other regarding preferences. A more accurate measure of the expectation that 
the receiver will behave nicely is the expected return elicited by subjects in the trust game.  
In Table 4, we test whether it is indeed the case in our experiment that the sender’s 
behavior is a combination of his/her expectation, risk aversion, and altruism. To this purpose, 
we regress the sender’s behavior on the expected return (as expressed by the same subject), 
his/her risk aversion obtained from the lottery game in the way of Holt and Laury (2002), and 
the degree of altruism, measured from the 8-person prisoners’ dilemma.  
In the first column, we regress the amount sent on the total expected return (across all 
the possible conditional strategies).  As in Karlan (2004), more risk averse individuals send 
less. A one-standard deviation increase in risk aversion decreases the quantity sent by 15%. 
This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The expected return also has an important effect on the sender’s behavior. A one 
standard deviation increase in the expected return increases the amount sent by $3, equal to 
16% of the amount sent on average. Finally, altruism increases the amount sent. A one 
standard deviation increase in altruism increases the amount sent by 10%.  
These effects remain even if we substitute the total expected return with the expected 
return given the different possible amounts sent. The only difference is that for a low amount 
sent (between 5 and 15) the effect of the expected return is not significant.  
                                                 
6 The questions are: i) “You can’t trust strangers anymore. Do you agree or disagree?”, ii) “When dealing with 
strangers, one is better off using caution before trusting them. Do you agree or disagree?” 
  11The results in Table 4 raise an important question: given that the decision to trust is 
the combination of many different factors, if we want to use the trust game to develop a 
measure of trust, should we consider the quantity transferred or the expectation?  For a 
measure to be useful, it must be able to predict behavior in different contexts. Since we know 
that the willingness to reciprocate or punish are very much context-dependent, in this paper 
we want to explore whether the expectation about others’ trustworthiness reflects an 
individual characteristic that is fairly stable across different environments.  
For this reason, in Table 5 we analyze the relationship between the senders’ expected 
returns and survey-based measures of trust.  Even if risk aversion and altruism should not 
affect the expected returns (at least in an expected-utility framework), in the regressions in 
Table 5 we control for them. For low levels of the quantity sent, none of these variables is 
significant. This is not surprising because if a subject sends a small amount of money, he/she 
is probably not really testing the trustworthiness of his/her opponent, because the temptation 
to keep everything, when everything is $5, is not a big one. Hence, only the expected amount 
returned when the amount sent is relatively large is a legitimate measure of trust.  This is 
what we observe from the data. For amounts sent bigger than $30, the expected return is 
positively and significantly correlated with the trust of the WVS question. The effect is large. 
A subject who is trusting according to the WVS question expects a return that is 14% higher 
than a non trusting person.  Consistent with our priors, both risk aversion and altruism are 
generally not significant.  
In Table – 5 Panel B, we check the robustness of these results to the insertion of other 
possible determinants, like age, gender, race, U.S. nationality, and inequity aversion. The 
effect of the WVS trust on the expected return is unchanged. Interestingly, when we control 
for risk aversion the gender difference in the amount sent disappears, suggesting the whole 
gender effect is due to differences in risk aversion.  
Glaeser et al. (2000) find that the WVS measure of trust is correlated with 
trustworthiness rather than trust. In light of our results, one possible explanation of their 
findings is that people extrapolate other people’s behavior from their own. If this is the case, 
a subject’s expectations are highly correlated with his/her own trustworthiness and so are all 
the measures of trust, such as the WVS measure.  
  12To test this proposition, in Table 6 we regress the expected return on all the variables 
used in Table 5 – Panel B plus the subject’s own behavior as a receiver. As the Table shows, 
the behavior as a receiver is highly significant and swamps the effect of all the other 
variables. While in the two panels in Table 5 the R-squared of the regressions was at most 
3%, the R-squared in Table 6 is between 33% and 42%. Hence, a person’s expectations are 
highly correlated with his own behavior.  
Table 6 looks at whether the WVS trust question is correlated with trustworthiness. 
Once again, for high levels of the quantity sent subjects’ trustworthiness is correlated with 
their answers to the WVS question.  A subject’s answer to the WVS question that most 
people can be trusted returns on average 20% more than a subject who answers negatively. 
The correlation between the WVS trust question and trustworthiness identified by Glaeser et 
al. (2000), thus, is likely to capture the extrapolation of the subject’s behavior. 
 
Comparing the different results  
So far we have only been able to account for Glaeser et al.’s results. But how do we 
explain that Fehr et al. (2003) do not find any correlation between survey-based measures of 
trust and trustworthiness? We think that the differences in the three papers’ results can be 
explained on the basis of two differences in the sample: the degree of homogeneity and the 
degree of mutual knowledge among subjects. The Glaeser et al. (2000) sample, composed of 
Harvard undergraduates, is very high on both dimensions: students know each other well and 
they are relatively similar. Our sample, made up of students who just started their MBA 
program, is intermediate in both dimensions: students know each other somewhat and they 
are relatively similar, albeit one third is international. Fehr et al. (2003), composed of random 
German households, is very low in both dimensions.  
Why do we care? In a sample where the knowledge of the other anonymous players is 
very high, the expectations about the receiver behavior will not differ very much across 
individuals, hence the sender behavior in the trust game will be mostly driven by altruism 
and risk aversion. This is the reason why the WVS question, which we found to be correlated 
with expectations, does not have any explanatory power on the sender behavior in the 
Harvard undergraduate sample. By contrast, in our sample, where students just arrived and 
did not know each other well, the WVS question has some explanatory power on the sender 
  13behavior, when we do not control for expectations. Unfortunately, Fehr et al. (2003) do not 
ask the WVS question to their sample. That similar questions they ask do have explanatory 
power in their sample, however, is not surprising because the degree of knowledge is very 
low and thus expectations are likely to differ widely.   
By contrast, the degree of homogeneity of the sample explains why in some cases the 
WVS question predicts trustworthiness and in others not. In a homogenous sample, players 
extrapolate their opponent’s behavior from their own (see Table 6). Hence, a survey-based 
measure which captures expectations (like the WVS question) is highly correlated with a 
player’s own behavior. By contrast, in a very heterogeneous sample this extrapolation is 
unlikely to take place. This explains why the WVS question is correlated with 
trustworthiness in the Glaeser et al. (2000) sample and in our sample, but similar questions 
are not correlated with trustworthiness in the Fehr et al. (2003) sample, in which subjects 
differ greatly.  
It is also interesting, that questions regarding past trusting behavior explain the 
sender’s behavior in the Fehr et al. sample even after controlling for the true expectations. 
This is consistent with the idea that the actual trusting behavior is a composition of 
expectations and preferences and that different survey questions are good at separating these 
different components. WVS-like questions are good at capturing the expectation component 
of trust, while questions on past trusting behavior are good at capturing the preference 
component of trust.       
IV. Conclusions 
Glaeser et al. (2000) question the validity of the WVS measure of trust by showing 
that it is not correlated with senders’ behavior in the standard trust game. They also show that 
the WVS question is a better measure of the receiver’s trustworthiness in the trust game. 
These results have called into question the use of the WVS question as a reasonable proxy for 
trust. By using a large sample of German households, Fehr et al. (2003) find the opposite 
result: WVS-like measures of trust are correlated with the sender’s behavior, but not with its 
trustworthiness.   
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a 
belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender’s behavior reflects both, we 
  14show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions 
on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.   
We argue that the variability in each of these two components depends on the degree 
of homogeneity and the degree of mutual knowledge inside each sample. This aspect should 
be considered by any future research that would attempt to extrapolate actual trusting 
behavior from games.       
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A displays the means and standard deviations of key variables in the trust game: the 
amount sent by the sender, the amount returned by the receiver, the return ratio (i.e. amount 
returned by the receiver as a percentage of the amount received which equals the tripled 
amount a subject is sent), the average amount that senders expect to receive in return from 
the receivers, and the expected return ratio.  These averages are weighted by the distribution 
of the amounts sent and therefore represent the true averages for a large enough sample. 
Panel B shows the number and proportion of students who send the different possible 
amounts, i.e. multiples of 5 between 0 and 50. We also show the average returned for every 
possible amount sent and the return as a percentage of the amount available to return for 
every possible amount sent. The table also shows the quantity expected in return and the 
proportion expected in return both conditional on the amounts sent. Panel C displays the 
number (and percentage) of students for each possible number of risky decisions chosen in 
the lottery game. The Constant relative Risk Aversion coefficient (CRRA) is calculated with 
the number of risky choices made by the subjects and following the technique by Holt and 
Laury (AER 2002). Panel D defines the main variables obtained from the survey and it 
displays some summary statistics on the several attitudinal questions related to trust. The first 
column contains the name of the variable, the second one the question asked in the survey, 
the third one all the possible answers, the fourth one the distribution of responses, the fifth 
one the mean and standard deviation. Panel E presents the raw correlations among the main 
variables. In each cell, the first number is the coefficient, the second is the p-value and the 
third is the number of observations.  
  
Panel A: Averages of variables in the trust game 
 
  Mean (std. dev.) 
Amount sent  $18.82 (14.9) 
Amount returned  $18.08 (10.07) 
Amount returned as % of amount sent x3 26.7% (0.16) 
Expected return  $20.91 (9.8) 
Expected return as % of amount sent x3  31.6% (0.16) 
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Expected return as 
proportion of 
amount sent x3 (%) 
0 54  (10.76%)  0  .  0  . 
5 63  (12.55%)  3.91  26.07  4.5  30.65 
10 115  (22.91%)  8.14  27.13  10.09  33.66 
15 42  (8.37%)  12.73  28.29  15.86  35.24 
20 65  (12.95%)  18.6  31.00  22.10  36.84 
25 39  (7.77%)  24.47  32.63  28.18  37.57 
30 33  (6.57%)  30.64  34.04  35.15  39.05 
35 9  (1.79%)  36.4  34.67  41.15  39.19 
40 29  (5.78%)  41.83  34.86  46.74  38.95 
45 7  (1.39%)  47.24  34.99  52.96  39.23 
50 46  (9.16%)  53.93  35.95  60.40  40.26 
 
Panel C: Lottery choices and risk aversion 
 





Risk Aversion: CRRA 
0 42  (8.37%)  0.7 
1 3  (0.60%)  0.48 
2 14  (2.79%)  0.44 
3 12  (2.39%)  0.40 
4 41  (8.17%)  0.36 
5 52  (10.36%)  0.32 
6 65  (12.95%)  0.27 
7 33  (6.57%)  0.22 
8 52  (10.36%)  0.16 
9 23  (4.58%)  0.1 
10 107  (21.31%)  0.034 
11 37  (7.37%)  0.038 
12 7  (1.39%0  -0.12 
13 2  (0.40%)  -0.20 
14 3  (0.60%)  -0.30 
15 9  (1.79%)  -0.40 
 








i) Most people 








Trust  Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? 





i) Not at all (1)  0.79% (4) 
ii) Not much 
(2) 
8.86% (45) 
iii) Quite a lot 
(3) 
41.14% (209) 





Suppose that a new and very 
desirable dorm/apartment has 
become available. The University of 
Chicago organizes a lottery to assign 
it among the many applicants. How 
confident are you that the allocation 
will be fair? 





Prob. < 25%: 
36% 
Prob. between 25% 
and 49%: 24% 
Prob. between 
50% and 74%: 34% 
Trust 
wallet 
Suppose that while walking on 
Michigan Avenue in Chicago you 
lose your wallet with 1,000 dollars 
inside. A random person that you do 
not know finds it. He or she does not 
know you, but he or she is aware 
that the money belongs to you and 
knows your name and address. He or 
she can keep the money without 
incurring any punishment. 
According to you, what do you think 
it is the probability he or she will 
return the money to you? 
Report a 
number 
between 0 and 
100, where 0 
means that the 
money won’t 
be returned for 
sure and 100 
means that it 
will be returned 
for sure. 
Prob. between 
75% and 100%: 6% 
34.87 
(23.00) 
i) Not good at 
all (1) 
0.2% (1) 
ii) Not very 
good (2) 
9.65% (49) 
iii) Good (3)  56.69% (288) 





How good are you in detecting 
people who are trustworthy? 
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Panel E: Correlations among the trust questions of the survey and the quantity sent 
 
   Amount sent   Trust WVS  Trust U. Chicago  Trust wallet  Trust detect 
Amount sent  1         
            
   502         
Trust WVS  0.1175  1       
   (0.0123)         
   454  457       
Trust U. Chicago  0.0085  0.1196  1     
   (0.8528)  (0.0121)       
   483  440  489     
Trust wallet  -0.0199  0.2018  0.136  1   
   (0.657)  (0)  (0.0026)     
   502  457  489  508   
Trust  detect 0.0785  0.029  0.0508  0.1383 1 
   (0.0843)  (0.5436)  (0.271)  (0.0021)   
   485  440  472  490  490 
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Table 2: Description of the variables 
 
Panel A provides the definition, range of answers, frequency, means, and standard deviations 
of individual characteristics obtained from the survey and the other games. Panel B displays 
additional summary statistics on the variables described in panel A.   
 
Panel A: Description of survey and games data 
 















White race  Whether the subject is of white 








Siblings  How many siblings do you 
have? 











Risk Aversion  CRRA calculated as in Holt and 
Laury (2002) 
Option A or 



















Inequity averse (all types): 
prefers symmetric outcomes, 
prefers advantageous outcomes, 
envious types (dislikes 
disadvantageous inequality), 
guilty types (dislikes 
advantageous inequality) 
Inequity averse 
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Panel B: Additional summary statistics on survey and games data 
 
Variable name  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Min  Max  N. obs. 
Risk Aversion  0.203  0.2285  0.22  -0.4  0.7  480 
Unconditional kindness  0.319  0.4664  0  0.00  1  502 
Inequity aversion  0.272  0.4453  0  0  1  508 
Age 28.319  2.4784  28.08  22.83  38.42  508 
Gender 0.311  0.4634  0  0  1  508 
White race  0.439  0.4968  0  0  1  508 
Siblings 1.5866  1.3654  1  0  13  508 
US nationality  0.6063  0.4891  1  0  1  508 
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Table 3: Determinants of the quantity sent in the trust game 
 
This table, replicating Glaeser et al. (2000), reports several OLS regressions of the 
quantity sent in the trust game on its possible determinants. All the variables are defined 
in Table 1D and Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
 
Quantity sent in the trust 
game   1   2   3   4 
Gender -3.07**  -3.62**  -3.34**  -3.08** 
   (1.46)  (1.45)  (1.42)  (1.45) 
Age -0.31  -0.18  -0.17  -0.07 
   (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
White race  1.11  1.81  1.09  1.48 
   (1.52)  (1.5)  (1.47)  (1.51) 
US nationality  0.8  1.79  1.74  1.83 
   (1.51)  (1.5)  (1.47)  (1.5) 
Unconditional kindness  4.01***  3.63**  3.83***  4.05*** 
   (1.53)  (1.5)  (1.47)  (1.49) 
Trust WVS  2.89**          
   (1.39)          
Trust U. Chicago     0.13       
      (0.99)       
Trust wallet        -1.04    
         (3.1)    
Trust detect           1.82* 
            (1.1) 
Constant 24.49***  21.56**  22.28**  12.98 
   (8.26)  (8.8)  (8.33)  (9.39) 
N. observations  454  483  502  485 
R-squared 0.044  0.038  0.033  0.041 
 Table 4:  Determinants of senders’ behavior in the trust game 
 
This table reports the OLS estimates of several regressions of the quantity sent in the trust game on its three main determinants: risk 
aversion, the sender’s expectation in returns, and altruism, which we measure as unconditional kindness (see Table 2). In the first 
column the expected return is the total expected returns across all the possible amounts sent weighted by the probability that amount is 
sent, while in the other columns we use the expected returns for the different possible amounts sent (recall that we asked subjects to 
make their choices according to the strategy method proposed by Selten (1967). When we introduce risk aversion the number of 
observations decreases because we eliminated 22 of the subjects with inconsistent preferences (they switched more than once in their 
lottery choices). All the variables are defined in Table 1 – Panel D and Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
symbols *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels  
 
 


















































































































































R2  0.105 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.081 0.101 0.111 0.126 0.126 0.139 0.142 
N.  obs.  480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
  25Table 5: Trust and Expected returns 
 
These tables report the OLS estimates of the expected return on the level of trust expressed in the questionnaire, their risk aversion, 
and their unconditional kindness. In Panel B we conduct a robustness check by including several individual characteristics.  All the 
variables are defined in Table 1 – Panel D and Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
 
















































































































R2  0.003 0.005 0.004 0.016 0.016 0.03  0.028 0.022 0.016 0.02 
N.  obs.  408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 
 
























































































































































































































R2  0.013 0.012 0.008 0.017 0.018 0.036 0.033 0.028 0.024 0.029 
N.  obs.  408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 
 
  27Table 6: Expected returns and trustworthiness   
This table reports the OLS estimates of several regressions of the quantity sent in the trust game.  All the variables are defined in 
Table 1 – Panel D and Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 





















































































































































































































































R2  0.355 0.4  0.371 0.328 0.391 0.377 0.393 0.413 0.406 0.368 
N.  obs.  436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 
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Table 7: Trustworthiness and trust 
 
This table reports the OLS estimates of several regressions of the quantity returned in the trust game. All the variables are defined in 













if send 15 
Amount 
returned 
if send 20 
Amount 
returned 
if send 25 
Amount 
returned 
if send 30 
Amount 
returned 
if send 35 
Amount 
returned 
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returned 
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Observations  454  454  454 454 454 454 454 454 454 454 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.000 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.031  
 
Figure 1:  Elicitation of senders’ expectations of receivers’ returns 








  30Figure 2:  Expected and actual proportion of money returned in the trust game as a 
function of the amount sent. 
The black line represents the proportion of the amount sent that on average the subjects 
expected to receive for given amounts sent. The red line is the actual proportion of the 















5 1 01 52 02 53 03 54 04 55 0
Amount sent
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
e
Expected
Actual 
  31